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Abstract
We propose a theoretical and econometric framework to evaluate the impact of war on economic growth
of a developing country with an open economy. The theoretical framework encompasses both the neoclassical
and endogenous growth models. The econometric model is derived from the theoretical framework and an
Autoregressive Distributed Lag framework is used for the estimation. We test this framework using Sri Lankan
data. The war had signiﬁcant and negative eﬀects both in the short and long-run (annual average of 9% of
GDP). High returns from investment in physical capital did not translate in sizable positive externalities. No
signiﬁcant eﬀects of openness on growth in the long-run are found; however, eﬀects are signiﬁcant in the short-
run. Inconsistent politically driven policies towards openness are the likely reason. As the ethnic conﬂict has
ﬁnally come to an end, a policy framework with appropriate institutional reforms is needed for rapid growth and
development.
JEL classiﬁcation: O53, O47, C32
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1 Introduction
During the past few decades many developing countries have faced conﬂict within their own boarders. These have
taken the form of civil war often related to ethnic conﬂicts or boarder disputes. In this paper a theoretical model
and a derived econometric framework are proposed for the case of a developing country with an open economy
at war. Sri Lanka will be used to estimate the model in this paper; however, the framework is general and can
be applied to other developing economies suﬀering from conﬂict. The model is a modiﬁed version of Lau and Sin
(1997a) common framework for the neoclassical and Romer’s growth models. This framework was generalized by
1Lau and Sin (1997b) to analyze public infrastructure and by Ganegodage and Rambaldi (2011) to study investment
in public tertiary education. In this study, we extend this framework to an open economy in war.
The literature on the eﬀects of war on economic growth, both theoretical and empirical, shows mixed results
(Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Gyimah-Brempong and Corley, 2005). The evidence from annual growth rates is
similarly mixed. Sri Lanka enjoyed a 5% annual growth rate on average (with the exception of 2001) over the 30
year period of its civil conﬂict (1983-2008), while many other developing countries with similar civil unrest such as
Afghanistan, Burundi and Somalia have failed to achieve such an outcome (Snodgrass, 2004; Wijeweera and Webb,
2009). It is the contention of this paper that even when measures of economic performance show a net positive
eﬀect, war is unlikely to have had a positive contribution to economic growth in the case of a developing country
that does not produce military hardware for the market.
War and Economic Growth: Theory and Empirical Evidence
The theoretical literature on the eﬀects of civil conﬂict on economic growth provides two contrasting views. The
ﬁrst view is backed by Benoit’s popular hypothesis (Benoit, 1973; 1978) which states war aﬀects positively economic
growth and development. This hypothesis which is in line with Keynesian economic theory argues that military
expenditure can be treated as expansionary ﬁscal policy that can stimulate the economy by increasing aggregate
demand and creating positive externalities. According to this view, military expenditures not only increase and
improve infrastructure, employment and production but also increase the skills of the workforce and the technological
development through military speciﬁc training and competencies. Using the European history experience, some
scholars claim that war plays a critical role in developing strong institutions (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Tilly,
1975). Therefore, war would result in positive growth and development in the long run. By contrast a second school
of thought argues that war damages the economy through the destruction of resources and by reducing investment
(World Bank, 2003). More importantly, expenditures in war activities have a high opportunity cost (Galvin, 2003)
as it crowds-out investment in other areas such as education, health and infrastructure. Further, ongoing war
activities not only crowd out investment in other areas but also hamper foreign direct investment by which many
developing countries, such as Sri Lanka, can ﬁnd an easy path to improve economic performance.
The empirical literature on the eﬀect of war has been in three main directions. The ﬁrst group tries to estimate
the cost of war using an accounting framework on which the budgetary costs of military expenditure, in the form
of decreased taxation revenues, and the cost of the destroyed infrastructure are taken into account (Collier et al.,
2003; FitzGerald et al., 2001). The second group compares the performance of countries aﬀected by conﬂict against
a benchmark. The benchmark country can be a non-conﬂict country (Stewart et al., 2001) or an artiﬁcially created
benchmark (Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). The third group employs regression based approaches (Blomberg
et al., 2004; Cerra and Sexena, 2008; Collier, 1999). These regression based approaches can be divided into two
main groups, namely, demand and supply based approaches. The demand based approaches are mainly empirical
2models of the Benoit hypothesis of war (Wijeweera and Webb, 2009; 2010). There are several supply side approaches;
among them, the Feder and Ram models are prominent (Biswas and Ram, 1986). They are similar to a Lucas dual
economy model; one sector is for military production and the other represents the civilian production. These
models do not suit developing economies well as they assume there is a sector that produce military hardware for
the market. There are other supply side approaches based on uniﬁed growth models which are more suitable as
they overcome some of the shortcomings of the demand based approach and the Fed and Ram model (Blattman
and Miguel, 2010; Collier, 1999; Murdoch and Sandler, 2002).
The most dominant group of empirical studies on the eﬀect of war on growth are cross-country studies while a
few country-speciﬁc studies are available (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). While some of these studies found positive
signiﬁcant eﬀects of war on growth (Stewart, 1991; Yildirim et al., 2005) others found signiﬁcant and negative eﬀects
on growth (Collier, 1999; Gyimah-Brempong and Corley, 2005). In some cases the eﬀects are found to be short
term (Murdoch and Sandler, 2002).
Measuring the eﬀect of war is a non-trivial problem. A number of measures have been used as proxies for war.
Among them, dummy variables (Chen et al., 2008), death or casualties (militant) of war per year (Gyimah-Brempong
and Corley, 2005; Murdoch and Sandler, 2002) and military expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Wijeweera and
Webb, 2009; 2010) to name a few that are prominent. All of these alternative measures suﬀer from some limitations.
For instance, dummy variables cannot be used to assess the long-run impact of war on growth. The number of
military casualties during a war is not suitable as this is a poor measure of the number of civilian casualties in
within-boarders conﬂicts as it is the case of Sri Lanka. In addition, measures of war casualties are sensitive for
parties who have engaged in the conﬂict and thus they are in general prone to manipulation and not systematically
available. In the case of many countries, including Sri Lanka, there are no annual ﬁgures. In an eﬀort to improve
reliability, this study constructs an index to capture the "war eﬀort." The index measures war eﬀort as a share of
the labor force. The measure is an "adjusted" share of the population in the armed forces to that in the labor force.
It is adjusted by the share of military expenditures to GDP (details provided in Section 3.1).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical framework and derived
econometric model. Section 3 presents the empirical implementation of the model to the case of Sri Lanka. The
ﬁnal section provides a summary and conclusions of the study.
2 The Framework
2.1 Theoretical Model
We consider an open economy with N (large) number of identical agents, the government, and an inelastically
supplied labor input. The consumption of an agent (household/ﬁrm) of this economy (to choose fct;kt+1g
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Et() and, cjt are the expectation operator conditional on the information set at time t and the consumption
level of agent j (j = 1;:::N) at time t, respectively;  2 (0;1) is the discount factor.
The resource constraint of the economy is given as:
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + Xt   Mt (2)
where,
Yt ,Ct, It ,Gt, Xt and Mt are the aggregate level of output, consumption, investment expenditures, government
expenditures, imports and exports at time t, respectively; and Xt   Mt = 0
Government expenditures are assumed to be ﬁnanced by a proportional income tax and the budget is balanced
every period. Therefore:
Gt = Yt and  is the tax rate.
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where,
yjt, kjt and ljt denote output, physical capital, and labor inputs of agent j at time t, respectively.
The function in equation (3) is constant returns to scale with respect to the capital and labor inputs of the
agent;  is private returns to physical capital while the externality eﬀects due to physical capital, war activities and
openness of the economy are denoted by , ! and ', respectively1. "
p
t is a random productivity shock in period t.
~ K, ~ W and ~ O are congestion adjusted available physical capital, war activities and openness at aggregate level
at time t, respectively. Congestion is created when the resources are allocated for physical capital, war activities
and openness. Eicher and Turnovsky (2000) described two types of congestion, namely, relative congestion and
aggregate congestion. Relative congestion is the level of services derived by an individual from the provision of
a public good in terms of the usage of their individual capital stock relative to the aggregate stock. Aggregate
congestion refers to how the aggregate usage of the service along inﬂuences the services received by the individual.
In this model the congestion eﬀect is assumed to be of the same form for all variables and given by:





























0    1. Kt , Wt and Ot are respectively the aggregate levels of physical capital stock, war activities and
openness.
The productivity impulses are modeled as an autoregressive stochastic process without a drift. i.e:
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t is a white noise process.
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Substitute these equations and express equation (6) in per ’eﬃciency unit’ to obtain (10):







































































which results in equation (10)










 yt,  t,  wt, and  ot; denote respectively, the level of output, physical capital, war activities and openness per
eﬃciency unit at t;  kjt denotes the individual’s capital.
At equilibrium  t =  kjt .
Thus:








Equation (11) is for endogenous growth as  = 0. If growth were exogenous,  would represent the rate
of technical progress. Expressing the function in per capita terms, exogenous growth can be made explicitly.
Substitute the equations for congestion eﬀects (4) into the production function (3):





























































Substituting these equations and expressing equation (12) in per capita (lji = 1):







































































At equilibrium t = kjt .
Therefore, in per capita terms
yt = A
(+ (+!+'))







yt, t wt and ot are, the level of output, physical capital, war activities and openness per capita at t, respectively.
2.2 Derived Econometric Model
If growth is endogenous it is created as a result of a positive externality eﬀect of physical capital; therefore,  = 0
,  > 0, random productivity shocks are I(0), and thus all log variables are diﬀerence stationary and the order
of integration of the log form of the variable is at most one,  + ( + ! + ')(1   ) should equal to 1 and all
external impulse processes, random productivity shocks due to physical capital, war and openness should be I(0).
For exogenous growth  > 0 and  = 0,  + ( + ! + ')(1   ) < 1, the external impulses can be I(0) or I(1).
The variables are diﬀerence stationary, if at least one external impulse is I(1). Otherwise, the variables are trend
stationary.
Linearizing (16) by taking logarithm gives equation (17)2:




2 =  +    [( + ! + ')]; 3 = !;4 = '; 5 = (1      [(1   )( + ! + ')] (18)
This linearized version allows the evaluation of the theoretical model in (16) on issues such as whether data are
consistent with endogenous or exogenous growth as well as the eﬀect of war on economic growth.
Estimation of the reduced form in (17) will not allow the recovery of all structural parameters. The parameter
of private returns to physical capital () and that of the externality eﬀect of physical capital () are functions of the
estimated coeﬃcients for other variables (see (18)), war and openness, and the parameter of the congestion eﬀect.
The externality eﬀect of physical capital,  is given by:
 = [2 + ([3 + 4])   ]=(1   ) (19)
2ln(1 + ) is approximated by  as we assume  is small.
7Note that when  = 1,  = 2+3+4 and  cannot be identiﬁed. However, it provides an upper bound for the
parameter  (private return to physical capital). Thus, we calibrate a feasible range of values for  using a range of
values within the feasible parameter space for  and . As observed by other studies the returns to physical capital,
, are higher for less developed countries (Tallman and Wang, 1994). In the empirical section this is discussed in
more detail and the estimates using Sri Lankan data are presented.
The testing and estimating the growth model in (16) is conducted by employing the Autoregressive Distributed
Lag (ARDL) approach (Bound testing approach) proposed by Pesaran et al. (2000; 2001). There are several
advantages of using this approach over the conventional method, the Johansen procedure. More importantly,
this method does not require pre-testing for unit roots of individual regressors3 which is still highly questionable;
therefore this approach is more eﬃcient (Baharumshah et al., 2009; Fosu and Magnus, 2006). A second reason to
use this approach is that it allows us to use diﬀerent number of lags for diﬀerent variables which is restricted in the
other approaches including the Johansen procedure. In addition, the cointegration analysis can be implemented for
shorter time series as in the case of our study, as Narayan (2005) has developed critical values for samples as small
of 30 observations.
This section has presented a theoretical and econometric framework suitable for the analysis of the eﬀect of
war on economic growth. Table 1 summarizes and maps the links between the theoretical framework and the
econometric approach at each stage of the study.
[Table 1 here]
3 The Case of Sri Lanka
Over the past 30 years, the war in Sri Lanka between the government forces and the armed militant group named
“the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)” has been a prominent part of its people’s life and economy. The
number of deaths is estimated at over 70,000 and around 5 percent of the population was displaced (Kuhn, 2009).
However, unlike the case of many other developing countries, by end of May 2008, the Sri Lankan government ended
this armed conﬂict using its own military power.
Sri Lanka is classiﬁed by the World Bank as a middle-income-group country (World Bank, 2011). Its population
is of around 20 million and it is a small multi-ethnic country. The two main ethnic groups are Sinhalese and Tamils;
the Sinhalese community forms the majority of its population comprising over 75%; the Tamils, who are concentrated
in the North and East of the island, form the largest ethnic minority comprising around 18% of the population.
The declaration of Sinhalese as the oﬃcial language by the government in the 1960s led to ethnic tensions and
conﬂicts between Tamils and Sinhalese as Tamils believed they had been discriminated by the government as well
3However, we have to verify that the variables are not I(2).
8as by the Sinhalese majority (Arunatilake et al., 2001; Sharif, 2011)4. Tensions between Tamils and the government
intensiﬁed in the late 1970s with the formation of several armed militant groups within the Tamil community. This
led to a brutal civil war which earned the title of “Asia’s longest war” in later years. By the 1990s, the group,
LTTE, which was founded in 1976, became the only group directly ﬁghting with the Sri Lankan government as
it was able to suppress other armed militant Tamil groups. At the highest point of their power, it possessed a
well-developed militia and was able to control over 75% of the land in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of the
country. The LTTE was able to built its own police, army, navy forces as well as an air force with a few light aircraft.
More importantly, it had a well trained suicide carder which was responsible for conducting several assassinations
including the killings of a president of Sri Lanka, a well known prime minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, as well as
many powerful government and opposition political leaders and higher ranked military commanders in Sri Lanka.
The suicide attacks and powerful bombs targeted many public places and strategic economic as well as security hubs
in other parts of the country, mainly in the capital, Colombo. During this period, there were four failed attempts
at peace talks including one attempt with direct Indian intervention which led to the deployment of the Indian
Peace Keeping Force from 1987 to 1990. Apart from this ethnic war, the country experienced two youth uprisings
in 1971 and 1987-1989 launched by Sinhalese youth in the southern part of the country against the government
which created many disruptions to the community.
Because of the war, Sri Lanka’s military spending as a percentage of GDP, increased from 1.6 percent in 1983
to 3.5 in 2008. It reached its peak at 5.9 percent of GDP in 1995, a ﬁgure that represents over 20 percent of total
government spending. Before 1983, arm imports were not a regular practice of the Sri Lankan government. However,
from 1984, arms were imported annually; in the year 2000, the government’s import bill for arms was around $US
274 million (constant 1990), the highest reported spending on weapons during the war period. Spending on military
activities in Sri Lanka is greater than that of many countries in the South Asian region (such as India, Bangladesh
and Nepal). Similarly the number of defense personnel increased by almost ten fold from 22,000 in 1989 to 213,000
in 2008.
A few studies of the war in Sri Lanka are available. Some of them have been descriptive (Arunatilake et al., 2001;
Grobar and Gnanaselvam, 1993; Kelegama, 1999). Arunatilake et al. (2001) estimated the direct and indirect cost
of war, and estimated the accumulated loss from 1983 to 1996 to be equivalent to over 160 percent of the GDP in
1996 using a constant interest rate of 5 percent. The direct costs include reduction in nonmilitary expenditure and
damage to infrastructure while the major portions of indirect costs consist of income loss from foregone investment,
reduced tourism and loss of human capital through death and injury, displacement of people and output forgone
in the war zone. Grobar and Gnanaselvam (1993) showed that the war signiﬁcantly reduced the investment ﬂow
into the country and therefore concluded that the war could have long run implications for the country’s economy.
Using the incremental capital output ratio and drop in investment GDP ratio they calculated a loss of around
4As noted by Grobar and Gnanaselvam (1993), the conﬂicts between these two ethnic groups has a long history and it dates back to
150 B.C.
920 percent of GDP during 1983-1988. Using time series techniques, Wijeweera and Webb (2009; 2010) tested the
popular Benoit hypothesis of the relationship between military spending and economic growth using four variables;
military and nonmilitary expenditure as a percentage of GDP, per capita income and interest rate. Following many
other prominent studies, they employed a version of a Keynesian model to assess the impact. The study covered the
period 1976 to 2007. The econometric approach employed was a VAR from which impulse response functions were
estimated. In the 2010 paper, they extend this approach to a cointegration framework. Neither of these studies
ﬁnds a sizable signiﬁcant eﬀect of military expenditure on growth; however, in the 2010 paper they found a positive
impact of non military expenditure on long run growth. These insigniﬁcant results may be due to their speciﬁc
theoretical approach and the variables chosen to represent war activity. As acknowledged by Wijeweera and Webb
(2009), the available data on military expenditure are prone to manipulation due to political sensitivities.
3.1 Variables and Data Used in This Study
Researchers have long debated over the short run vs long run eﬀects of conﬂicts, endogeneity between the conﬂicts
and growth, as well as over the recovery of factors of production, in particular physical capital, to the equilibrium
level in war torn countries (Blattman and Miguel, 2010;Murdoch and Sandler, 2002 Wijeweera and Webb (2010)).
The framework adopted in this study treats variables as endogenous. The war period was from 1983 to 2008 and
the analysis in this study covers the period 1960-2008. During the study period, the openness of the Sri Lankan
economy has varied. From 1956, as the political power shifted to an anti western group, the country tasted import
substituting economic policies to overcome unemployment and balance of payment diﬃculties. From 1965-1970,
the political power changed to a pro-western group and the government attempted to introduce more liberalized
policies in 1968; however, it failed due to the popularity of anti western ideologies. During 1972-1976, the political
power again changed to a group with leftist political ideologies which adopted tighter policies to ease the eﬀects of
the oil shock (Athukorala and Rajapatirana, 2000). In 1977 a new regime with pro-western ideas came to power and
introduced a liberalization program to improve the economic performance through attracting foreign investment.
This liberalization framework has been continued until now with minor changes, though the political power changed
from time to time. These changes in economic policies are taken into consideration in this study. However, due
to limited data availability, we cannot include any institutional variable although we recognize their importance in
studying growth performance during conﬂicts (Blattman and Miguel, 2010).
The model consists of four main variables namely output (GDP), physical capital, war and openness which are
expressed in per labor unit. Though GDP data can be obtained directly from available sources, data on all other
variables are not directly available. Therefore, the variables, except GDP, are constructed or proxied by other
suitable variables. Using investment data the capital stock data series was estimated by the perpetual inventory
formula used in Binder and Pesaran (1996) with a 4% depreciation rate. To construct a measure of “war eﬀort,”
we combine two variables, the ratio of the number of personnel in the armed forces to the number of people in
10the labor force and the military expenditure as a ratio of GDP. The expenditure in military activities are readily
available from the World Bank and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. The number of people in the arm forces are not
readily available for some years. Therefore, the series was constructed using information from various formal (e.g.
the World Bank) and informal sources such a newspaper articles taken from brieﬁngs from the Ministry of Defence
in Sri Lanka. We employ these two measures to construct an index of war eﬀort. The estimated index of war eﬀort,
^ wt, is measured as an adjusted (by defense expenditures) measure of the proportion of people in the armed forces
compared to those in the country’s labor force. Speciﬁcally, the index is given by the predictions from the following
multiple regression model,
ln(armt) =  + 1 ln(milext) + 2 ln(armt 1) + 4D77 + t (20)
^ wt = exp( \ ln(armt)) (21)
where, milex is government expenditures on defense activities as a ratio of GDP; arm is the ratio of the number of
personnel in the armed forces to the number of people in the labor force; D77 is a dummy for the period 1977-2008
when more open economic policies were pursued. Table 2 presents the estimates of model in equation (20) and
Figure 1 presents the predicted war eﬀort index ( ^ wt).
[Table 2 here]
[Figure 1 here]
It is clear from the ﬁgure that from 1980 to 2000 the war eﬀort grew exponentially to close to 2% of the labor
force and remained relatively stable until the end of the conﬂict in 2009. The index is used as one of the variables
in the econometric model.
The variable ^ wt is known as a generated regressor in econometric theory (Pagan, 1984). The asymptotic variance
of the OLS estimator is heteroskedastic and requires adjustment when generated regressors are included (Oxley and
McAleer, 1993; Wooldridge, 2002). The generated regressor problem does not arise (at least asymptotically) in the
estimation of parameters in a cointegrating regression due to the super-consistency of the OLS estimator in this case
(for a discussion see McAleer et al. (1994)). The limiting distribution of the Wald statistic used in this study to test
for cointegration (i.e. the Autoregressive Distributed Lag bound tests of Pesaran et al. (2001)) has T-convergence
as well (see Theorem 4.3).
The working age population, 20-64 years, is used as a proxy for the labor force as a continuous set of published
data is not available. In addition, we employed several dummy variables: DO1 to represent the economic slow down
of 2001 due to an electricity crisis combined with intensiﬁcation of the war, DO to represent the period with most
inward looking economic policies and D77 to present the period with more outward economic policies. These were
11gathered from various issues of the Annual Reports of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka Central Bank,
various years; 1998), World Development Indicators (WDI) and many other sources including newspaper articles.
The empirical estimation is presented in the next section.
3.2 Empirical Results
The econometric model is estimated by implementing Pesaran et al. (1999; 2001). The Bounds Test of Pesaran et
al. (2001) is used to test for a valid long-run relationship. If cointegration is found, the model is estimated using an
ARDL representation following Pesaran et al. (1999). The Bounds test is conducted on a conditional autoregressive
distributed lag form:
















where 4 denotes the ﬁrst diﬀerences and all variables are expressed in log form, output (lny), physical capital
(lnk), war eﬀort (ln ^ w) and openness (lno).
The Bounds test is a cointegration test for the null hypothesis, H0 : 1 = 0 and 2;3;4 = 0 in (22). The test
involves the comparison of the F-statistics against the critical values which are generated for speciﬁc sample sizes.
In this paper we use the critical values generated by Narayan (2005). To determine the value of p, we test up to a
maximum lag length of 5 as the sample size is limited. Table 3 provides AIC, BIC and two LM statistics for testing
for residual correlation of orders 1 to 5.
[Table 3 here]
The evidence for exogenous/endogenous growth is assessed by including a time trend (non-zero deterministic
trend) within the cointegrating relationship (see equation (17)) in the ARDL model (see 22) and conducting the
Bounds test in the ARDL models with and without the time trend. The computed F value when the time trend
is included is 4.59 which is greater than the upper bound of the critical value provided by Narayan (2005, p.1989)
for n=50 (critical value bounds at 5 percent: 3.05 for I(0), 3.97 for I(1)). However the time trend is not signiﬁcant
(5 = ). The calculated F statistics for the existence of a long run vector in the equation without the time trend
is 5.04 (the critical values for the lower bound I(0) and the upper bound I(1) at the 5% level are respectively 2.86
and 4.01 (Narayan 2005 p. 1988)). These results indicate the existence of cointegration in the model without a
time trend. These ﬁndings indicate the model is consistent with an endogenous growth model.
The next step is to estimate the long run relationship (for the levels) and short run dynamics. Here we follow
Pesaran and Shin 1999, and ﬁnd the most parsimonious model for the Sri Lankan data to be an ARDL(3,1,3,5).
12This model is used for further testing and estimation.
The estimated speed of adjustment and the short run dynamics are presented in Table 4. The estimated long
run relationship (standard errors in parentheses) is given as:
d lnyt = 1:27lnkt   0:09ln ^ wt + 0:25lnot (23)
(0:16) (0:04) (0:20)
[Table 4 here]
The estimated coeﬃcients of the above long run relationship are signiﬁcant at the 5% level and yield expected
signs except for the openness measure (details shortly). Many coeﬃcients in the short run equation are signiﬁcant at
either the 5 or 10 percent level. The estimated adjustment coeﬃcient is small in magnitude (-0.26) indicating that
adjustment back to equilibrium from a shock to output is slow (approximately 4 years to recover). The estimates
of the coeﬃcients of the dummy variables are signiﬁcant at least the 10 percent level and with expected signs.
Our main interest is on the war measure. We ﬁnd the eﬀect of war on output is negative. The coeﬃcient
estimate implies that one percent increase in the "war eﬀort", as measured by ^ wt - an adjusted share of involvement
in the armed forces (in relation to the labor force), would result in approximately 0.09 percent reduction in output
in the long run. In addition, the estimates of the short run coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at either the 5% or 10%
and some with expected negative signs. Therefore our results imply that there have been negative impacts from
the war on the Sri Lankan economy both in the short as well as in the long run. We note that ^ wt increased from
0.001 in 1980 to approximately 0.02 by 2000 with an exponential increase between 1985 and 2000 (see Figure 1).
According to Grobar and Gnanaselvam (1993), on average, there was around 4 percent annual loss in output during
the early stages of the war. During the later stages, when the war reached its peak, the loss of output would have
been much higher than the estimate of Grobar and Gnanaselvam (1993). Richardson and Samarasinghe (1991)
estimated around 60 percent loss of GDP in 1988 for the same time period. On average that is around 10 percent
annual loss in output which would be higher for the early stages of war. This is very close our ﬁgure. The study
by Arunatilake et al. (2001) projected the total output loss during 1988 -1996 using three levels of interest rates,
zero rate, 5 and 10 percent. Their calculations are that the average annual GDP loss ranges from almost 12 to
17 percent which are relatively high compared to our estimate. However, both projections are not from a direct
assessment of war eﬀort on economic growth using advanced econometric techniques. Using an estimate for the loss
of growth rate due to war through a cross country regression, Collier (1999)and Hoeﬄer and Reynal-Querol (2003)
estimated around 15 percent of annual output loss for a hypothetical country in a war. Therefore our estimate of
around 9 percent loss is reasonable.
The estimated coeﬃcient of the openness measure 4 = ' is not signiﬁcant. However, all short run coeﬃcient
13estimates are signiﬁcant and some of them have negative signs. This variable captures a range of policies. During
the sample period these ranged from inward looking and highly regulated to more liberalized. Thus, the results
seem not surprising and are similar to those of previous studies. The inward-looking, import-substitution policies
during 1960-1977 period led to an increase in imports of capital goods and raw materials (to initiate local industries)
contrary to expectations (Athukorala and Jayasuriya, 2000; Athukorala and Rajapatirana, 2000). The liberalization
policies introduced in 1977 did not provide the desired outcome either due to not only inappropriate macroeconomic
policies, but also other calamities such as the ethnic war and civil insurgencies a decade later. The early years of
the liberalization process (from 1977-1988) were overtaken by political interests which at the time were on massive
public sector investment on popular irrigation projects, housing schemes and transport. These projects, in particular
the massive irrigation schemes, were under donor funded concessionary aids, in which accountability and eﬃciency
of usage of funding were not a priority (Dunham and Kelegama, 1997). Therefore these investments resulted in
widening budget deﬁcits, inﬂationary pressures and hazardous economic eﬀects similar to a “Dutch disease”. The
economic disruptions and sharp increase in defense expenditures due to the ethnic war and civil insurgencies also
led to deleterious eﬀects on the country’s ﬁscal standing and overall macroeconomy, as well as the international
competitiveness of the trading sector. After 1985 and due to foreign direct investment ﬂows, the manufacturing
sector exports, especially the garment industries, overtook exports from the traditional plantation crops, tea, rubber
and coconut, inherited from British Colonial rule. However, Sri Lanka was not able to establish a high tech industrial
sector through FDI due the increasingly competitive neighboring countries. Other rapidly growing countries in the
East Asian region (NIC) such as Malaysia and Taiwan experienced rapid growth through these high tech industries.
As highlighted by Dunham and Kelegama (1997), Sri Lanka inherited a highly politicized system and therefore the
whole liberalization process was dominated by the establishment of ineﬃcient institutions. Therefore, the eﬀects of
open economic policies were constrained by many factors such as, inappropriate political driven policies, war and
lack of governance which led to loss of competitiveness in the international market.
The next step is to recover the private returns to physical capital and its externality eﬀect. The estimates for
physical capital, i.e. private returns to physical capital () and the externality eﬀect of physical capital () are
functions of the estimated coeﬃcients of war, openness and the parameter of the congestion eﬀect (see (18)). As
indicated in Section 2, by setting  = 1 an upper bound of the parameter for private returns to physical capital is
found,  = 2 +3 +4. The upper bound is   1:20 implying almost increasing returns to physical capital. This
value is relatively high compared to the values reported for other developing countries (see for instance Tallman
and Wang (1994) who found 0.66 for the Taiwanese economy). For developed countries the value has been found to
be around 0.30. Studying the relationship between economic growth and FDI, Balamurali and Bogahawatte (2004)
found almost constant returns to both FDI and domestic investment. Therefore, our estimate of increasing returns
to capital would be a conservative ﬁgure.
The externality eﬀect of physical capital, , can be calibrated using equation (19). We calibrated values for 
14for combinations of value within the ranges  =0.33, 0.50, 0.65, 1.0, and  =0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.20.
The results are presented in Table 5.
[Table 5 here]
When  is relatively low and the congestion parameter  approaches 1 (consistent with an economy in equilib-
rium), the externality eﬀect of physical capital would reach a high value (over 8.0). However, when values of  are
relatively high, the values of  (externality eﬀects) tend to be lower. As observed by other studies, the returns to
physical capital, , tend to be higher for less developed countries. The estimates using Sri Lanka data indicate that
 has been quite high during the sample period leading to very low externality eﬀects of physical capital compared
to its private returns at all levels of congestion (see Table 5). War is likely to have aﬀected investment ﬂows (see
Grobar and Gnanaselvam (1993)) resulting in high returns to investment in physical capital; however, these high
private returns did not translate into any sizable positive externalities for the Sri Lankan economy.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
We propose a theoretical and econometric framework to analyze the eﬀect of war on economic growth of a developing
country with an open economy by modifying the theoretical framework of Lau and Sin (1997a; 1997b). We test this
framework by investigating the impact of war on the economic output of Sri Lanka during the period 1960-2008.
We can draw several signiﬁcant conclusions on Sri Lanka’s economic performance from our ﬁndings. Benoit (1973)’s
hypothesis of a positive eﬀect of war on output does not hold for the case of Sri Lanka, a small economy with no arms-
producing sector. The estimates are signiﬁcant and the negative eﬀects are estimated at an annual average of 9% of
GDP. The eﬀects are found to be signiﬁcant both in the short as well as in the long run. Secondly, our study ﬁnds
high returns to physical capital which suggests the country may have a relatively low level of capital accumulation
and that would be imposing a constraint on production activities. As noted by Snodgrass (2004), physical capital
accumulation could be aﬀected during war time due to the destruction of infrastructure and productive capital,
and the reduction in both private and foreign investment. Though we have not conducted an in depth analysis to
check the eﬀect of war on physical capital accumulation, Grobar and Gnanaselvam (1993) found signiﬁcant eﬀects
of war on investment ﬂows. Our results indicate that higher returns from investment in physical capital did not
translate in any sizable positive externalities for the Sri Lankan economy. Finally, we do not ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect of openness on growth in the long-run; however, there are signiﬁcant eﬀects in the short-run. The
inconsistent politically driven policies towards openness are the likely reason for these results. As highlighted by
other studies, institutional reforms tend to lag behind liberalization attempts (Dunham and Kelegama, 1997). In
the case of Sri Lanka the situation was exaggerated by war and civil unrest. Therefore, as the ethnic conﬂict has
ﬁnally come to an end, a policy framework with appropriate institutional reforms is needed to lead the economy to
rapid growth and development. Sharif (2011) has highlighted the importance of a proper institutional framework
15without political inﬂuence to reduce ethnic discrimination, which is vital for future stability and development of the
country. Overall, our ﬁndings contribute to the existing literature and provide an appropriate theoretically based
modeling technique to analyze the relationship between war and economic growth.
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20Table 1
The relationship between the Economic Model and the econometric estimation
Theoretical model Econometric Approach












a) lag length test
b) test for cointegration et s I(0)
Neoclassical ("P
t s I(0) or I(1)) et s I(0)orI(1)
Endogenous et s I(0)
c)Test for time trend in the cointegrating
relation
Neoclassical  > 0
Endogenous  = 0
Speed of Adjustment of Output to
Disequilibrium
Estimation of ECM and short run dynamics
2) Parameters of the Growth
Model
2) Estimation of Cointegration
Vector
lnyt = 2 lnkt + 3 lnwt + 4 lnot + 5t
! =externality eﬀect of war 3
' =externality eﬀect of openness measure 4




= Private returns to physical capital Upper bound  = 2 + 3 + 4, if  = 1
= Parameter of congestion eﬀect In the range of (0 - 1]
= externality eﬀect of physical capital  = (2 + (3 + 4))   )=(1   )
21Table 2
War Eﬀort Index - Estimates of equation (20)











SC(2) [p-value] 0.21 [0.90]
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SC(4) [p-value] 2.70 [0.60]
Q-Stat(1) [p-value] 0.1054 [0.75]
Q-stat(10) [p-value] 14.811 [0.14]
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Figure 1. Estimated War Eﬀort Index
23Table 3
Statistics for selecting the order of the ARDL
lag AIC BIC 2
(1) [p-value] 2
(2) [p-value]
1 -5.595773 -5.162760 0.073 [0.78] 4.10[0.53]
2 -5.566862 -4.970566 0.47 [0.49] 8.66[0.12]
3 -5.547787 -4.784974 5.13 [0.02] 15.19 [0.00]
4 -5.526970 -4.594326 15.16[0.00] 22.22[0.00]
5 -5.795368 -4.689498 7.37[0.00] 13.76[0.02]
24Table 4
The Estimated Short Run Dynamics and Adjustment Coeﬃcient of the ARDL (3,1,3,5)




4ln ^ wt -0.17**(0.05)
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SC(1) [p-value] 2.92 [0.09]
LM-2
SC(5) [p-value] 6.23 [0.25]
25Table 5
Recovered values for the externality eﬀect of physical capital () for diﬀerent combinations of private returns to
physical capital () and congestion eﬀect ()
  = 0:33  = 0:50  = 0:65  = 1:00  = 1:10  = 1:20
0.1 1.03 0.85 0.68 0.29 0.18 0.07
0.3 1.30 1.06 0.85 0.35 0.20 0.06
0.5 1.79 1.45 1.15 0.45 0.25 0.05
0.6 2.22 1.79 1.42 0.54 0.29 0.04
0.7 2.92 2.36 1.86 0.69 0.36 0.02
0.8 4.34 3.49 2.74 0.99 0.49 -0.01
0.9 8.59 6.89 5.39 1.89 0.89 -0.11
26